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COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION
AND THE LAW OF THE CHARTER
William O. Miller
I-INTRODUCTION
The subjects of "intervention" and
its corollary of "nonintervention" are,
without doubt, two of the most controven~ial in the literature of international
law. 1 I t is even difficult to find any
substantial aweement among international law publicists as to the meaning
of the terms. The definition of "intervention" which seems to command the
most agreement, however, has been
phrased as follows: " ... any act of
interference by one state in the affairs
of another; but in a more special sense it
means dictatorial interference in the
domestic or foreign affairs of another
state which impairs that state's independence.,,2 The doctrine of "nonintervention," being inextricably intertwined
with what at hest JJlW~t he de~crill('d as
Ihr mnbil!lIollS conl'l'pl of "intrr\"l'ntion:' nl'\'I'rtlll'h,ss has Il('l'n ;II'I'I'ptl'II
allllo:::t univer:::ally as a proper guideline
for thc conduct of statrs. It found its

most inclusive definition and its most
comprehensive endorsement in General
Assembly Resolution Number 2131
(XX), as follows:
No State has the right to intervrnc, dircctly or indircetly, for
anv reason whatever, in the inte;nal or external affairs of any
other State. Consequently, armed
intervention and all othcr (orms
of interference or attempted
threats against the personality of
the State or against its political,
economic and cultural elements
are condemned. 3
It is the purpose of the discussion
which follows to develop the proposition that these broad pronouncements,
whil!' appearing to proscribe the "dirta:.
lorial inll'rfefl'ncI' in 1111' IIffllirs of n
slall,," 110 not tlo so at 1111. hilI rallll'r
serve only to transfer competence to
exerdse this "dictatorial interference"
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from individual slales to eollcdivities of
slales acting rithcr throul!h or under Ihe
au spiers of the United Nations. This
proposition has as it!l hasie conceptioll
that intervcntion, as defined above and
subject to the concepts of nccessity and
proportionality, has always b('l'n rc'eo~
nized as a lawful exercise of the indisputable international right of sanction, usable to enforce an international
legal right, and that intervention, as a
sanction, has neither been restricted nor
proscrihed; that only the competence to
apply it has changed. It wiII he further
demonstratrd that this very process of
multilateralizinl! the right of sanction
has resulted in thc development and u,.e
by thc Great Power,. of regional collectivities through which they seek to
exrrcise the right of sanction for political rather than legal purposes.
In developing this thesis, the concept
of intervention as a "dictatorial interference in the affairs of a state" will be
accepted, specifically, however, with the
limitation that intervention is taken
only for the purpose of compelling a
state to satisfy its international obligations. 4 Thus, intervention wiII he discussed as the process through which the
international community seeks to prcvent an international drlict from dcveloping into an international dispute or
through which it othrrwi,.e sl'l'ks to
redress an international wrong. Divorced
from this discussion wiII be those acts of
interfercnee by a state in the affairs of
anothcr statc which do not have cither
an actual or a claimed antccedent international delict. Such acts have universally been considered as unlawful and
prohibited by customary international
lawS unlcss they were based on an
existing treaty right permitting such
interference. 6

II-DEVELOPMENT OF
THE SANCTION:
A IIISTOIUCAL SKETCH
Tlwrt, i:..: l"'rtainly no douht"" thai thl'
traditional international law failed to

provide any workahle system through
which a !llatl~, ulili~in~ ('I'nlrali~I'd pro('('dures, could SI'(,k l'('dn'ss for n wrong
done to it hy another state. This wa!l :1
horizontal system in which all sUUjcctf;
wrre thcorrtically rqual and in which
Ilwre w('r(' no ('slahli!llw(1 pro('rdllrt's 10
s('ek redress through community sanctions. The only genuine restrictions on
thc acts of a state dependcd on considerations of reciprocity! or on the
power relationships between an offending and an offended state. Because
of the primitive nature of this system
and because there was a necessity to
provide some procedure beyond that of
inefft'ctivr reciprocal and s('lf-imposrd
restraints for thc enforcement of intcrnational obligations, thcre developed
the practice of self-help. i\luch like thc
situation which exists in any primitive
society, it was necessary for each individual-i.e., each state-to rcly on its
OWI1 ability, its own strength, to f;crk
redress for wrongs done to it. Self-help
has thus " ... been universally recognized as a means of enforcement ... [of
international law, i.e.,] ... as a sanction.,,2 There were basically two typcs
of forcible self-help available. The first
was war and the second was the doctrine of reprisals. 3 I nlrrvcntion, as defilll'd abovc. arose as a form of n'prh;aI.
it wa:; nothing more nor Irss than a
manifestation of "the dependence of
law in a primitive communi!l upon
various tcehniques of self-help.' Forerful interventions in the form of reprisal~
therefore were recognized as lawful,
circumscribed only by the requirements
of l1t>cessity and proportionality. The
legitimacy of this type of forcible selfhelp was made clear in Hague Convention Number II of 1907 when, for the
first time, it was agreed " ... not to have
rccourse to force for the recovery of
('onlra('1 <It'hls dIll' from onr Sial<' 10
IiiI' nalional:; of anolill'r. hili in Ihal
I'a:;,' 1I1011l'."S TIIII:;, it 1111:; hl'l'n :;ni,1
Ihal, " ... with only o Ill' :;lI1all (':IVl'at,
the ~reat powers immediately before
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World War I reaffirmed thr right of
forl'ihle self-help. -,6
The Covenant of the I,eague of
Nations was the first break in this
traditional philosophy. The adherents to
the covenant agreed to "respect the
territorial intrgrity and existin~ political
independence" of other members7 and
to submit to arhitration or to inquiry by
the Council of the League of Nations
those disputes of an international nature
which could not he settled by diplomacy.s Following shortly on the heels
of the covenant came the Pact of Paris,
or the Kellogg-Brillnd Pael, in which the
parties agrerd that "selliement or solution of all disputes or confli('ts of
whatever nature or of whatever origin
they may be, which may arise among
them shall never be sought except by
pacific means."9 At about this same
time the Latin Ameriean Rrpublies
brgan to vorcc, in concl'rt, strl'IlUOUS
opposition to the intervention policy
which the United States had followed
extensively in the Western Hemisphere
since the mid-WOO's. Tn Rio de Janeiro
in J 927 the Inter-A merican Commis~ion
of Jurists recommended to the forthcoming Conference of Havana that it
consider adopting the principii' that
"No nation has a right to inli'rft'rt' in
the intrrnal or forl'ign affairs of 1111
Americlln Hepuhlir against the will of
that Hrpuhlic.,,1 0 While U.S. objeetions
prevented adoption of this principle in
J9211,11 it wm~ arlopted in 1<):3:3 with
U.S. reservations I 2 and finally in
Ruenos Aires in JCJ:3() without {I.S.
reservations. In article I of the Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Tntervention,I3 adopted by the American
states at Buenos Aires, the parties declared as "inadmissible the intervention
of anyone of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the
intl'rnal or I'xlt'rlHlI affairs of any olht'r
of the Part iI'S. " This principle WllS rcpeatl'rl and hroadt'l1I'll in till' I)('("Iaration of Principles of Inter-Anwrican

Solillarity

and

Cooperation in

this

lan~uage:

(a) Intervention by one State
in the internal or external affairs
of another State is condemned;
(b) Forcible
collection
pecuniary debts is illegal; and

of

(e) Any difference or dispute
between the American nations,
whatever its nature or origin, shall
be settled by the methods of
conciliation, or full arbitration, or
through the o~eration of international justice. 4

By the time of the Mexico City
Conference of 1945, this principle had
become ingrained in inter-American law,
and the Act of Chapultepec simply
reiterated its "condemnation of intervention in the internal or external affairs of another.,,1 5 Thus, when the
members of the United Nations met in
San Francisco in' 1945 to draft the
Charter of the United Nations, the
unilateral resort to force, even as a
means of s(,lf-help. had received substantial in ternational ronilemnlltion.
TIll' rl'sults of the San (i'raneisco
Confert'nct! relleet tIlt' same revulsion to
tilt! unibteral USI~ of force as had lhl'
various treaties referred to ahove. Expressing a determination to "save succeeding gencrations from the scourge of
war, which twice in our lifetime has
hrought untold sorrow to mankind, ,,16
and a determination to "ensure ... that
armed force shall not be used, save in
the common interest,,,1 7 the writers of
the charter stated that it was part of
their purpose:
To maintain international peaee
and ~I'curily, and 10 thnt end: to
lakl' dfective ('ollective IllC1H,urcS
for the prtwI'nlion lind rt!l11ovnl of
threats to the peace ... and to
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bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach
of the peace. 1 8
In support of this and other stated
purposes, the members of the United
Nations pledged themselves to "settle
their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace" and security, and justice,
'
are not en dangere,
d ,,1 9 an d to "refram
in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against tl~e territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations. ,,20
The significant point here is that
while the charter in article 2 (4) contains a general prohibition of the unilateral use of force in international
relations, it promises an "effective collective" substitute. Thus, in those situations where an international dispute
cannot be settled by peaceful means
between the parties, the charter
promises the collective efforts of the
organized intcrnational community to
take such measures as are necessary to
prevent or remove any thrcat to the
peace which mayor does result. The
charter would therefore no longer permit a state to take the law in its own
hands and to seek redress by force.
Given the law of the charter, the primitive international law of the jungle
would be replaced by a civilized determination of right and wrong, of delict
and redress, and of rights and responsibilities. Whether or not the charter has
constructed collective machinery adequate to this purpose, however, is quite
another question and, it would Sl'em, a
most rrucial one. For if the promised
suhstitute for unilatc'ral action is not
forthcoming, states could hardly be
expected to refrain from developing

other procedures and perhaps from even
falling back to thrir prior practicc of
unilatl'ral forcihle scM-help. "Clt·arly, a
law which pro hi hits resort to force," or
stated otherwise, which prohibits the
resort to unilateral self-help, "without
providing a legitimate claimant with
adequate means of obtaining redress,
contains the seeds of trouble. ,,21 It has
even been argued that "( I] f the collective organization, through a fault in its
organizing instrument, leaves a gap
where the use of force is necessary but
the coIleetive organization is impotent
to act, then the legal right to use force
must, in such instance, revert "back to
the members.,,2 2 I t is abundantly clear
from current international practice that
this process has long since begun. States
have sought, and are seeking, substitutes
for the promised universal actions which
seldom materialize. The impotence of
the international community as a whole
has led to the development of smaIler
coIlectivities which, while demonstrating a capacity to act, have at the
same time shown that the compatibility
of their actions with the more comprehensive provisions of the charter is
sometimes open to serious question.

III-CHARTER REGULATION OF
THE USE OF FORCE
General Provisions. As noted ahove,
artiele 2 (tl.) of the charter contains u
gl'Il!'raI prohihition of the tltrl~at or II:-;C~
of force "against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any
state .... " Only two exceptions to this
general prohibition are provided: (1)
Preventive or enforcement actions tuken
by or under the auspices of the United
Nations, provided for in article 42 of
the charter; and (2) individual or eollec:
tive self-defense, provided for in urticle
51. All othl'r rrsorts to the usC' of force
in inLrrnational n·lations "fall into the
category of international cll'lid:-;" and
are themselves violations of international law. 1 This reflects the charter's
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purpose to "('liminat/' the thrl'at or ure
of force wlll,ther it be lawful or unlawful under gt'neral international law"
except in legitimate self-defense or as a
part of the collective sanctioning
process? There should be little doubt,
therefore, that unilateral, forcible selfhelp as an aceeptablt' sanction in international law has been prohibited.3
There are, then, only two permissihle
usl's of armed force under the charter.
The first of these-the collective processes by or under the auspices of the
United Nations-are provided essentially
through powers granted to the Security
Council in chapter VII of the charter.
Article 39 invests the Security Council
with the authority and responsibility to
"determine thl' existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of thl' peace, or act
of aggression and ... l to] ..• make
recommendations, or ..• [to] ... decide what measures shall be taken to
maintain or restore international peace
and security." Article 42 provides for
the use of armed force to accomplish
this purpose if the peaceful, nonforceful
measures of article 41 are considered
inadequate; and article 48 provides that
such action is to bl' carried out, suhject
to the determination of the Security
Council, hy "l\lembcrs of the United
Nations directly and through their
actions in the appropriate international
agencies of which they are members."
Article :10 makes it clear that this
"preventive or enforcement action" is
to be taken against statc.~. While this
may seem an unnecessary observation, it
is nevertheless a crucial one. By endorsing these principles, states are seen
to have relinquished a portion of their
sovereignty and to have consented, in a
proper case, to subject themselves to
forcible but lawful pressures from without. This is but a nl'ct's:::ary corollary to
Professor Jes:::up 's ar{!:umt'nt4 that tilt'
prohihition of til<' use of forcl' in artiel(,
2(.~) is a limitation on the traditional
concept of sovereignty which permitted
a state to re:::ort to force to redress a

wrong donc to it. I f this asped of
is now limited hy int('rnational law to an oJfrlldl!d stllte, it would
necessarily follow, if any sort of effective system is to be maintained, that any
previous right of an offending state to
be immune from the application of
force must likewise be Iimited. s The
importance of these limitations lies in
the fact that they effect a significant
modification of the nonintervention
principle as previously expressed. Intervention is now specifically legitimatized
when taken by or under the auspices of
the international community as a whole.
Intervention, then, at least in the terms
in which it was defined above, is specifically sanctioned by the charter.
It must be said, tht'refore, that the
charter seeks to make significant inroads
on the traditional concept of sovereignty as an "absolute, uncontrolled
state wiII, ultimately free to resort to
the final arbitrament of war, ,,6 and as a
tradition under which states "do not
readily yield to concepts of international supervision.,,7 The charter seeks
to remove the "quicksand on which the
foundations of traditional law are
huilt"S and to suhstitute in its stead the
firmer base of collective supervision and
collective action.
sov('n~ignty

Provisions Relating to Regional Organizations. As was noted above, chapter VII of the charter assigns to the
Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the primary authority to take such action and
to provide such sanctions as may be
necessary to that end.
An important part of the machinery
through which these actions may be
accomplished are the regional arrangements recognized in chapter VIII. The
part that such organizations could and
should play in the collN'tive strUt'tum
was debated at length both at Dumbarton Oaks and at the San Francisco
Conference. 9 The result was twofold-
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the recognition in article 5 J of the right
of collective self-defense and the inclusion of articles 52, 5il, and 54 to
provide a legal framework for reconciling the actions of regional organizations with those of the United Nations.
These laLLer provisions have been
criticized as a compromise of the concept of universalism and as resulting in
an ambiguous legal rationale concerning
the relative jurisdictional competences
of the United Nations on the one hand
and a regional organization on the other
and concerning just what measures or
actions are within the authority of a
regional grouping. 1 0
It is true that the recognition of the
"inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" in article 51 did represent a concession to those states-particularly the Latin American Stateswhich desired' to see a measure of
regional autonomy in their respective
groupings. This was considered necessary, particularly insofar as self-defensive actions were concerned, in order to
prevent a possible Great Power veto in
the Security Council from precluding
essential, defensive actions. 1 1 Article
51, then, was specifically in tended to
permit a regional grouping or an individual state to take necessary mem:ures
in self-defense and to continue such
actions until "the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.,,12
The ambiguity arises when this right
of a regional organization to use force in
self-defense is compared with the charter provisions relating to disputes which
it may attempt to settle and "measures"
or "actions" which it may take. Article
52, while recognizing the primary responsibility of the Security Council,1 3
charges members of the United Nations
who arc also members of a regional
organization with making "I'very t'ffort
to achievr raeifie st'lllt'nH'nt of I(wal
dispult's Ihrough sUl"h n'p:iollal ap'nI'il's ... lwfort' n'[t'rrillp: tlwlIl 10 t\tl'
~ecurity Coundl." And artirle 53

aulhorizes tlU! S('l"Urity Coundl to utilizr such arnmgl'ments for "ellfort't'ment actions uIHh'r its authority." With
one exception not here pertinent,14
however, prohibition is made of any
enforcement action "without tlw authorization of the Security Council."
These provisions have given rise to
repeated controversy between those
states seeking a measure of regional
competency in settling regional disputes
and those seeking to maintain the primacy of the central organization. The
controversy has been .twofold and may
be expressed as follows: (1) Is there a
jurisdictional conflict between the Security Council and a given r<'gional
organization; and (2) What actions, if
any, may a regional organization take
without prior Security Council authorization?
The jurisdictional problem. This
portion of the controversy concerns
itself with which body, the Security
Council or a regional organization, has
the competence to deal with a particular
dispute. Does either body possess an
exclusive right to hear and determine
the dispute? Or, is there a shared competence; and, if so, does either body
have a primary right to proeeed?I 5
Tht, language of tht! c1l:lrlt'r would
appear to resolve c1t~arly thit; i:lHIIC in
favor of a shared competence hut with a
recognized primacy in the Security
Council. Article 52(2) does counsel
members of regional organizations to
make every effort to settle their disputes within that regional framework
"before referring them to the Security
Council." Article 52(4), however, makes
it clear that this "in no way impairs"
the right of the Security Council to act
in the case or the right of any member
to request Security Council action.
The Gualt'mala Casr. This isslII'
was first <h'hatt'" bt'[om IIH' SI'I'uril\"
COllncil in .I une JI)5.~, when G ualt·mala
requested that the Security Council
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convene to consider its allegations of
aggression against Nicaragua and Honduras, so that it could take the necessary measures "to prevent the disruption of peace and international security
in this part of Central America. ,,16 The
Governments of both Nicaragua and
Honduras expressed surprise that this
matter should have heen brought before
the Security Council when there were
available the processes of the Organization of American States which, they
said, were established to hear interAmerican differences. 17 Brazil submitted a draft resolution by which the
Security Council would have referred
the matter to the OAS for its urgent
consideration. The debates which followed saw a wide divergence of opinion
as to the course which the Security
Council was obliged to follow. The most
restrictive view was presented by the
delegate from Colombia, as follows:

I should like to make it quite clear
that the provisions of Article 52,
paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter impose on all Members the duty to apply first to the
regional organization, which is of
necessity the court of first appeal.
This is not a right which can be
renounced because the States
which signed the Charter undertook this obligation. 111
On the other hand, the representative of
the Soviet Union argued that it was "the
Council's duty to take responsibility
and to take urgent steps to end the
aggression,,,19 and he announced that
he would exercise the Soviet Union's
right of veto on any resolution which
referred the matter to the OAS for
action.
rVlost of the remaining members of
thr S('curity Council clearly favored
rl'frrencl' of IIII' malll'r to Ihr OAS,
altholl~h it is obvious Ihat this was nol
considered as rrlinquishing Security
Council jurisdiclion in the mattrr. Thl'

resolutio!J.. which was finally put to a
vote called for immediate termination
of acts likely to cause further bloodshed
and would have referred the complaint
to the OAS for eonsideration. True to
his threat, however, th(~ repres,mtative
of the Soviet Union cast a negative vote
and prevented the resolution from
carrying. A substitute resolution was
quickly passed. I t read as follows:
The Security Council.
Having considered on an urgent
basis the communication of the
Government of Guatemala to the
President of the Security Council,
Calls for the immediate termination of any action likely to cause
further bloodshed and requests all
Members of the United Nations to
abstain, in the spirit of the Charter, from rendering any assistance
to any such action. 2o

The matter was again raised on 25
June 1954 at the 676th meeting of the
Security Council, when a debate took
place concerning whcther or not the
Council should again place the Guatemalan complaint on its agenda. These
dehates saw the representative of Brazil,
OlH:e lI~ain, contmllling Ihal Ilw ()AS
WllS the proper organization to senle
this dispute. Since thc Inter-American
Peace Committee was already acting in
the matter, he was able to cite its
activities in support of his arguments. 21
Colombia, citing pertinent provisions of
the OAS Charter, 2 2 reiterated its argument that the regional machinery of the
OAS must be utilized before Security
Council competence is invoked, since to
do otherwise, he said, would "imply a
disauthorization of the American
a~l'nry" to which Colombia could not. lJ'
n:"'TI'('. 23 '1'1 I(! •Sov\('1
ilion wm~ III I1111111111
ill ils insistl'lIcn that the maUer must h('
placl~d on the agrnda of the Security
Council. I t poinLt~d out Ihat the
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Security Council had already acted in
the case by its resolution adopted in the
675th meeting, and argued that now it
was time that the Security Council
"adopted measures to ensure the fulfillment of" its decision. 24 Ambassador
Lodge of the United States asserted that
the Security Council was faced for the
first time with the problem of translating into reality the charter formula
providing for a balance between the
principle of "universality, the effect of
which was qualified by the veto power,
and regional arrangements. "25 The substance of his arguments was as follows:
The United States does not deny
the propriety of this danger to the
peace in Guatrmala heing brought
to the attention of the Security
Council in accordance with Article 35 of the Charter. That has
been done .... The United States
is, however, both legally and as a
matter of honour, bound by its
undertakings contained in Article
52, paragraph 2 of the Charter of
the United Nations and in Article
20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, to
oppose consideration by the Security Council of this Guatemalan
dispute until the matter has first
been dealt with by the Organization of American States which
through its regularly constituted
agencies, is dealing actively with
the problem now .... Weare ~on- ,
vinced that failure of the Security
Council to observe the restraints
which were spelled out in the
Charter will be a grave hlow to
the entire system of international
peace and security which the
United Nations was designed to
achieve. 26
The vote of the Security Council not
to place the Gmltemalan complaint in
its agenda 27 has heen interpreted as a
victory for the United States. sinre it

was thus enabled 10 handle the matter
in the councils of tit(' (lAS witcrc\ it was
the dominant power unrestricted by the
Soviet veto. 28 While there may be some
considerable justification for this argument, it still remains a basic fact,
notwithstanding the positions advanced
during the debates, that the failure of
the Security Council to take direct
action in the case cannot be properly
construed as a determination that its
competence docs not exist at least
concurrently with that of a regional
organization. To the contrary, the
Security Council did act in the case by
passing the resolution at its 675th meeting. The refusal to take further action
only reflected a preference for settlement of this particular dispute at the
regional level, where it appeared that
the regional agency was capable of
taking the necessary action.
The handling of this dispute gives rise
to certain initial observations concerning the relative competences of the
Security Council and a regional arrangement. These are:
The provIsIOns of article
52(4) to the effect that the competence
of a regional organization to make every
effort to settle local disputes within the
machinery of their regional grouping "in
no way impairs the Iluthority of II II!
Security Council" to be seized of the
same matter remain valid;
Regional organizations will
be permitted to act in accordance with
the authority granted to them where
they demonstrate a practical ability to
take effective action; and that therefore,
It must be said that when
first faced with the jurisdictional issue,
the Security Council acted so as to
endorse the principle that both they and
a regional organization share compet('nce-or possess concurrent jurisdiction-and that the primary opportunity
to act would probably be accorded the
rt'gional grouping in tho~c l'a~('s when' it
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demonstrated an ability to act effectively.
The Cuban Case. This entire
controversy was again raised before the
Security Council in July 1960, when the
Government of Cuha requested urgent
consideration of "the grave situation
which now exists ..• as a consequence
of repeated threats, harassments, intrigues, reprisals and aggressive acts to
which .•. LCuba] .•• has been subjected" by the United States.29 The
Cuban representative began his presentation to the Council with this statement:
The right of any State which is a
Member of the United Nations to
have recourse to the Security
Council cannot be questioned.
The regional agencies do not take
precedence over the obligations of
the Charter .... I t is obvious that
regional arrangements made under
the terms of Article 52 of the
Charter entail rights which are of
an optional rather than an exclusive character, and that Member
States may exercise whichever of
those rights they choose.3o
The representative of the United States
replied that this matter was currently
under consideration by the Council of
the Organization of American States
and that the "Security Council should
take no action ... Luntil] ... discussions have taken place •.. " in that
Organization. 31 He disclaimed any insistl'nce, however, that this reflected in
any way on the competence of the
Security Council to hear the Cuban
complaint. He stated:
Let me say that it is not a
question of which is greater or
which is less-thl' Organization of
An1l'rican Statrs or the lInitC'd
Nation~. Tht' point i~ that it
makl'S sl'n!'c·· and thl' Charter ~o
indicatrs-to I!o to thl' rrl!ional

organization first and to the
United Nations as a place of last
resort. There is no question, of
course, of replacing the United
Nations. 32
This same rationale clearly motivated
Argentina and Ecuador to submit a
draft resolution,33 later adopted, under
which the Security Couneil took note of
the situation existing between Cuba and
the United States and adjourned its
consideration of the matter pending an
invitation to the OAS to assist in resolving the dispute and to report its
activities. The positions of the various
members of the Security Council on this
draft resolution reflected a three-way
split in opinions on the jurisdictional
issue. One extreme was represented br
the United Kingdom34 and France3
who contended that Cuba had a legal
obligation under the charter and under
the Charter of the Organization of
American States to seek resolution of
the matter in the regional agency prior
to requesting action by the Security
Council. On the other extreme were the
Soviet Union and Poland who argued
that the Security Council had primary
jurisdiction in the matter and that it
would be illegal to refer the matter to
the OAS. 36 The great majority of the
vi(!ws expressed, however, were ill accord with those of the sponsors of the
rcsolution-·that the resolution found "a
formula, which while taking account of
the fact that proceedings are under way
in a regional agency, does not bar the
parties concerned from access to the
United Nations •..• "37 The language of
the operative portions of the resolution
compel this understanding of the Security Council's action, and it clearly
supports the initial observations drawn
above from the Guatemalan case. The
Security Council, in handling the Cuban
t~OJnplaint, was Ill;scrting its ultimate
t'omllt'tt'l1l'e but WIIS dcfcrrinl-t to the
pradical and, it was hoped, effective
machinery of the rl'gionul gronping.
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In late October 1960, Cuba renewed
its complaint, this time in the Gcneral
Asscmbly.38 In spite of the fact that by
January 1961 Cuba was contending that
its invasion was imminent, the General
Assembly had taken no action on the
case. Cuba, thus, on 4 January 1961,
moved again to seek Security Council
consideration of the matter. 39 Although the Cuban complaints were
debated at length,40 the Security Council did not take any official action on
them. Thus, despite the fact that by late
April 1961 the abortive Bay of Pigs
invasion had actually occurred, the
Cuban complaints stilI were left to the
Organization of American States. This
was recognized in a resolution later
adopted by the General Assembly's
First Committee on 21" April 1961.'u
Although the Plenary Session of the
General Assembly, in later acting on this
First Committee Resolution, refused by
a substantial majority to specifically
refer to the OAS, this may not be said
to diminish the significance of the prior
actions of the Security Council in referring the matter to that organization.
Conclusion. No case, subsequent to the two above discussed, has
arisen in which the jurisdiction relationships of the Security Council versus a
re{!:ional organization have hecome a
significant issue.' Although there were
undertones of this controversy in the
1963 dispute between the DOglinican
Republic and Haiti and in the 1964
complaint by Panama against the United
States, both controversies found the
parties mutually williI1: to utilize the
procedures of the OAS. 2
Notwithstanding the contrary contentions made by some during the
above-noted debates, it is concluded
that the actions of the Security Council
do not substantiate the argument thai a
{!:Imuilll' iSS1U! concerning the rt'spedivt'
jurisdidiolls of tIll' SI'('urity Counl'i1 and
a rt'gional organizlItion w,{s ever joined.
While some states did lIrgue to tlwt

effect, the great majority of states
clearly conccded concurrent jurisdiction
in both bodies, but wiLh primary ril{ht
to proceed in the Security Council. The
issue was a political and a practical
one-essentially, should the Security
Council give practical substance, in a
proper case, to the charter provisions
relating to its use of regional organizations for the settlement of disputes
which were of purely regional character? This question was answered with a
simple "yes." The answer did not mean,
nor was it ever intended to mean, that a
party to a dispute could be foreclosed
from seeking Security Council assistance
without first exhausting its remedies in
the subordinate organization. Notwithstanding this conclusion, however, it
must be conceded that the great majority of members of the Security Council did, in fact, make considerable concessions to the proposition that a
regional organization is a better forum
for settling disputes than is the Security
Council. The search for alternate means
of settlement-i.e., means other than the
veto-afflicted Security Council-was
thus well on its way.
The "enforcement action" issue.
The second major controversy between
the "regionalists" and the "universalists" is concerned with the natum of
the action which can be taken by a
regional organization with respect to a
dispute of which it is properly seized.
This arises from the interaction of the
provisions of article 52(2) and article
53( I). The first of these charges the
regional organization with making
"every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes," while the latter
specifically admonishes that" •.. no enforcement action may be taken under
regional arrangements ... without the
Lmlhorization of the St'curity C.olllwil."
The I}ut'stion tlllls arist's m: 10 what
an' tllest' "t'n foret'mcnt Ilt'lions" whidl
are prohibited to a rt'gional organization
without
prior
Security
Council
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approval, lind whllt other lIctions lire Il'ft
to its initilll competence?
Neither reference to lhe records of
the San Francisco Conference nor to
other hackground papers to the charter43 provide any real assistance in
discovering the meaning of the term
"enforcement action." Reference to the
charter itself also fails to provide any
direct assistance. The term appears only
four times in the charter-alone in article 45, twice, and in the phrase "preventive and enforcement action" in article
5. The term "enforcement measures,"
however, appears twice in the charteralone in article 2(7), and in the phrase
"preventive and enforcement measures"
in article 50.
No key is readily lIppart'nt to the
rt'asons he hind this different phrasing.
There is no specific indication in either
the charter H:seIT or in the background
debates as to why the drafters used
"enforcement action" in one article
alone, in conjunction with "preventive
action" in another, and why two other
articlt's speak in tl'rms of prt'ventive or
enforcement measures. One would Ct'rtainly assume, however, thllt if the
drllfLers of the c1111rter meant tllll SlIlIIe
thin~ in elleh of till'st' lIrtidt's thllt tllt'y
would havt' lIst'd tllll sanlt' It'rlllinolo~y.
It wClllld S('('III "I"lIr, th,'r"for(', thllt tl\('
lerlll "t'nfon"'IIlt'nt 1Il'lion" liS ma'" in
article 53 means something differt'nt
than the "preventive ... action" or the
"preventive and enforcement measures"
ust'd elsewhere.
The answt'r to a part of this confusion very prohably lies in the differentiation set forth in articles 41 and 42 of
the types of processes which can be
undertaken by the Security Council.
Article 41 provides for "measures not
involving the usc of armed force" to be
utilized to effect Srcurity Council decisiems. Arti,'I,' ,1·2, on tilt' otllt'r hand.
p,'rlllits "at'! ion hy lIir. S"lI lind 1:11111
fon'('s" if lilt' 1Il,'aSlIn'S of artiel .. ·1-1 ,!rI'
not considert'd lIdt'quate. \I "Ill'!', it
wOllld logically follow' that tht' It'rlll

"ac·tion" should he interpret!!(1 liS 1It:companied hy tilt' us,' of lIrJ1l1'd force
while the terlll "measures" would not.
While this ·does give a key to the
differentiation between "preventive and
enforcement measures" and "preventive
and enforcement actions," viz, the
presence of the usc of armed force in
the latter, there still remains the problem that article 53 only prohibits a
regional organization from taking "enforcement" and not "preventive" action
without the authorization of the Security Council. No clue has been uncovered which would give any assistance
to a resolution of this problem. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the charter
speaks of four different types of
proct'sscs which may he taken hy the
Security Council, and it denies only one
of these-enforcement action-to a ref!ional organization without its first
securing Security Council approval.
Thus it is concluded that nothing in the
charter prohibits a regional organization
from taking, without Security Council
authorization either:

(1) preventive measures;
(2) prevmltive action; or
(:J) enforcement nWlIsures.
This nliturlilly rais,'s lIlt' 1}\I('stion of
tl\(' dil'l"'I't'ntialion hI'! w,','n Ih,' ntij('t'tives "preventiv,'" lind "t'nfon:eJlll!nt."
A logical explanation appears in the
provisions of articles 41 and "·2 10 the
dfect that the measures or actions
which they contemplate arc to be employed to give effect to the "decisions
of the Security Council "-decisions
which hllve been taken under article 39
to "maintain or restore international
peace and security." Enforcement measures or action, therefore, arc preceded
by a determination either that a "threat
to the peace" or a "breach of the
P";I('('" t'xists anti t hut it mllst h,' d.. all
wilh ill n ,·,'rlnin nlllnnt'r. 11"IIt·,,, IInv
m,'a:mre or al'lion takt'n unt!,'r nrtide ,1:1
or 42 is either an (,lIforccmcllt measure
or all (,lIforc('m(,lIt aetioll, gilll~'~ iL ig
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taken to place in effect, or to enforce, a
decision of the Security Council concerning how the threat or actual breach
should he settled.
A' totaIly different situation exists
where there is neither a "threat to the
peace" nor a "breach of the peace" but
where, nevertheless, there is a situation
which could mature into such if outside
assistance is not brought to bear. This is
the "prevention ... of threats to the
peace" spoken of in article 1(1), giving
rise to the obviously contemplated need
for "preventive" actions or "preventive"
measures. Since these types of processes
are not prohibited to a regional organization, it must be concluded that thcy
are properly matters for regional competence under arLicle 52. The above analysis, therefore, would support the following types of actions by a regional
organization without Security Council
authorization:
Preventive measures-not involving the use of armed force;
Preventive action-involving
the use of armed force; and
Enforcement measures-not
involving thc use of armed force.
It is recognized that the ahove
nmy ~eem to Ill' an \IIulllly
technical and tortuous attcmpt to inter·
pr!!t into thc charter an unintended
competence in regional organizations.
However this may be, it seems ohvious
that a start down this tortuous path is
already well under way. This has heen
occasioned by the unwiJIingness of the
powers to entrust disputes in which
they are interested to the veto·bound
Security Council and by the resultant
inahility of the Security Councir to
furnish the "effective collective" substitute for unilateral self-help which it
promised.
rea~oning

The Palestine Case (I9·m). Thitt
was first seen in the Syrian attempt to
justify the Arab actions in the hostilities

which hroke out almost immediately
after the State of Isracl was cstahlished
in 11)4~t It was argued Lhat the illLervention of the Arab StuLes in Palestine was
taken under the authority of article 52
of the charter. Since the Arab League
was a recognized regional organization,
it was within its competence to seek a
pacific settlement of the local situation
in its area. This argument was met with
the adamant rehuLLal hy the United
StaLes that the Arau League's acLions
were in the nature of "enforcement
actions" and that such were prohibited
without first securing the authorization
of the Security CounciI. 44
The Dominican Republic Case
(1960·61). This issue was again debated
in the Security Council in connection
with the sanctions imposed on the
Dominican Repuhlic by the members of
the OAS in .late 1960. At the Sixth
l\1eeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, the members of the
OAS, acting coIlectively, condemned
the Dominican Republic for acts of
intervention and aggression against
Venczuela. I t was resolved that the
mcmbers of the OAS should apply hoth
diplomatic and economic sanctiolls
a~ainf;t the ])olllinil~all HI'pllhlil~.4 5
Th(,~I' ad ions w,t'rt' rl'porlt~" to I III!
'1 4 t; '1'1 Ie ,0Vlct
S . ll'
L'ecunty .OUIICI.
111011
promptly submitted a draft resolution
under whieh the Security Council would
have specifically approved the action of
the OAS.47 In support of his draft
resolution, the Soviet representative expressed complete agreement with the
actions taken by the OAS but insisted
that the actions taken were "enforcement actions" within the meaning of
article 53, and that, as such, they
required the authorization of the Security CounciI.48 This has heen astutely
terllled a "shrewd ta!'licalmovl~" 011 the
part of till' Sovit'l Union, shu'l' it ttou~ht
"to ctttahlish the compelt'lIt:l' of the
Security Council to control the application of enforcement measures by the
L'

•

('
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OA8, hy advO!:atin{.1: the approval. not
tIlt' rt'jrl:tion, of OAS action in the
initial casc:>4 9
The memhers of the OAS who were
sitting on the Security Council were
quick to reco~nize the purpm;e hchind
this Soviet move. The rcprescntative of
Argentina ohserved:

Security Coulleil. Other pacifying
a!'liolls UIIII('r rl'giollal nrrnllgl'ments lIS envis;lged under Chnpter
VIII of the Charter which do not
come into this category have
simply to he hrought to the attention oC the Security Council under
Article 54.5 5

The Soviet view is that, undcr
Article 53 of the Charter, the
Security Council is competent to
approve the steps recently taken
by the Organization of American
States with regard to one of its
members. A t the same time it is
clear that, a rOlltrnrio .~CllSIl. the
Sovirt view also implies that the
Security Council is entitled to
annul or revise these measures if it
sees fit. 5 0

Other members of the Security Council
were not ready to go quite so far.
Several expressed the view that the term
"enforcement action" was ambiguous
and required further study so that its
meaning could he determined. It was
their feeling, however, that this particular case could he disposed of without
making this determination.
Only Poland lent its support fully to
the Soviet position. The remainder of
the Security Council either fclt that
there was no need to determine if the
actions of the OAS were, in fact, "enforcement actions" or that they did not
constitute such actions.
The three-power substitute draft was
put to a votc and carried hy a vote of 9
to 0, with Poland and the Soviet Union
abstaining.
Two conflicting opinions of the
effect of this vote have been put forwnrti. The first, thnt of John C. Dreirr,
is that:

Argentina did not feel that it was
necessary for the Security Council to
take a position on this Soviet view and,
in conjunction with Ecuador and the
United Statrs, suhmitted a suhstitute
draft resolution under which the Security Council would simply take note
of the actions of the OAS. 1
The United States, arguing in support
of the suhstitute draft resolution, stated
simply that the mcasures taken hy the
OAS were entirely within the authority
o( a regional organization, since any of
the actions being taken collectively
"could he taken individually hy any
sovereign statl' on its own initiative."5 2
Strong support for this positioll was
giVI'1i hy VI'nezurla,53 China,54 and the
United Kingdom. The latter's r('presentative gave this analysis of the situation:
... it is the view of my dclegation
that when Article 5:~ refers to
"rnforcemcnt action," it must he
cOl1trlllplatinl! thr cXl'rci~r of
fon:I' in 1I n1:I11I1I'r whidl wllulll
not nnrJll"I\~ hI' h'gitilll:ltl' for ;lIIY
Stah' or group of States (''(C('pt
IIllCh'r the authority of thl'

By adopting the American alternative rather than the Soviet proposal, nnd thus nvoiding any formal upproval or disapproval of the
OAS action, the Security Council
in effect endorsed the view held
by the Sixth Mceting of Foreign
Ministers: that authorization of
the Security Council was not
necessary. An important precedent was thereby established. 5 6
On the other hand, Professor ..Inis L.
Claudl'. Jr.. ('ontpnlls th;lt, hl'l'uusr of
tIll' 1I\II'l'rtuinty I:X prl'ssl'll by IIllln)'
1III'l1\be[:; eonerrning the validity of tht'
leglll p08ition advnnced hy the United
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States, the Council's action "hardly
represented a decisive endorsement of
the proposition that thc authorization
of the Security Council is not required
for OAS sanctions "falling short of military force. ,,57
I t is this author's view that the
opinions expressed by Mr. John C.
Dreier represent the more reasonable
analysis. While it may he true, as Professor Claude asserts. that some members of the Security Council were unwilling to directly support the U.S. legal
posiLion on the meaning of the Lerm
"enforcement ac~ion," it remains a fact
that in their vote for the substitute
resolution they lent their effective support to this proposition. The effect of
the adoption of this rcsolution-particularly in the context within which it
was dehatl'd-is that Security Council
approval of thl' type of action taken hy
the OAS is /lot required. All memlH'rs
had an opporLunity Lo vote for the
Soviet-sponsored approval, and their
decision to vote instead on the suhstitute draft must be interpret('d as a
decision that it was preferable Lo Lhe
Soviet draft, Lhat vote on the Sovi(,t
draft was not desirahl(), ancl, hl'nce, Lhat
approval of the OAS aelion was not
necl':;sary .
TllI'rt' is no question hut Ihat Iht'
handlill/! of Ihis casl' hy the SecuriLy
Council has set a significant precedcnt
leading toward the emancipaLion of
regional organizations from a restrictive
inll'rpretalion of artielc ;';1. And Ihig ig
as it should hI'. Collective sanctiong hy a
regional organizaLion should h() permissihle if such sanctions are noL in
conflict with some provision of the
charter. Certainly collective sanctions,
which would be lawful if taken unilaterally, should fall within the authorized
catl'gory of regional al'tions. In this
n'/!ard the followin/! ohsl'n"ation of tht'
Thoma:','s i:, p,'rtin,'nt: ..... tlll'n' i,.
not hin/! in till' Chart"., I hal would pro·
hihit a :::tat" from applyin/! :::anl'liong
IlIIihltl'rally against anotlll'r staLe so long

as under Article 2. Paragraph 4, such
sanctions do noL involve a thrcaL or usc
of force. ,,5 8
The significance of Lhc Security
Council's resoluLion of this case lies in
Lhc fact that iLs determinaLion was, in
effect, a determinaLion that the nonforceful measures Laken by the OAS
were similar to those non forceful measures outlined in arLicle 41 of the
charter and that they were not "enforcement actions," huL raLher were
"enforcement measllres." As such, Lhey
lie within the competence of a regional
organization, in accordance wiLh thc
analysis set forth above.
The Cuban Casc (J anuaryFebruary 1962). The dccisions takcn in
the Dominiellll Rrpuhlic ea~e wcrl' sLiII
fresh in thc milld~ of the membcrs of
the Sl'curiLy Council when, in early
I ()()2, Lhc question of the legiLimaey of
actions of the OAS again came inlo
prominence. In January 19()2 Lhe
EighLh l\leeLing of Consultation of
MinisLrrs of Foreign Affairs, in a mecting held at Punlc del EsLl', passed a
s()ries of r('soluLions suspending Cuha
from Ilw OAS and impoHin partial
eeonomic sanctions on her: 9 Culm
ont'(' a/!ain soughl IInilt'd Nalions assis·
liltll'('. SIll' firsl purslIl'd IlI'r l'olllplainls,
tlin'cled l'ssenlially a~ainsl Ihl' II ni\('d
SLates, in tlw Gcneral Assembly, AfLer
more than 2 wecks of dcbatc~, however,
Lhe Gl'neral A~sl'l\Ihly oVl'rwhellllin~ly
refused lo lakl' any aclion.(·o ellha Lillm
appt'aled to the Security Council Lo hear
iLs case, uuL the Security Council refused to place the Cuban complaints on
its agenda, essenLially because the matler had been fully dcbated in the General Assembly.61 [n the dehatcs preceding this determination, it was ouvious that many members of the Sccurity
COlIIll'il l'onsirl('rl'd llll' Cuhan ('0111plaint::: as nolhin~ ilion' Ihan a n'I'lI:::t
th,' I ()hll I )olllini":1II Hl'JlIIhlil' iSSIJI'. mill
al 1,'asL the Unitcd SLall's, the United
Kingdolll,
Chi""
and
Venezuela

r

or
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considered that the preeedent l:wt in that
cnse rmldercd a rediscus~i()n of the i&:ue
unnecessary.
On B ~lareh 1962, Cuha took a new
tack.' Now she requested the Security
Council to seck an ndvisory opinion
from the lnternntionnl Court of Justice
concerning whether or not the measures
taken against her by the OAS were
"enforcement actions" which were
within the competence of that organization without its first obtaining Security
Council approval. 62 The dehates on this
Cuhan request consumed seven full
meetings of thc Council, extending from
14 to 22 March. 63 E~entially the same
positions were asserted in these debates
as had been in the two prior dehates on
this issue. This time, however, the
United States found far greater support
for its position that the actions undertaken hy the OAS were not "enforcement actions" within the meaning of
article 53 than it had in the Dominican
Republic case. France,64 China,6s the
United Kingclom,66 Irefand,67 Chile,68
and Venezuela6 9 all expre~ed e~ential
concurrence with the U.S. interprctation. The Soviet Union found support
only from Cuha, a norunemher of the
Security Council, tlw United Arah
Republic, and Rumania. The dC'legnlC'
from Ghana ('''pre&:ed a willinglll'ss to
hnve the maUC'r heard hy the In t(,rIIntional Court since he did not feci that
the debates in the Dominican R(:puhlic
ca~e demonstrated a c1(~ar drawing mill
determination of the issue. 7o After exhaustive debates, the Security Counc:i1
rejected the Cuban proposal by a vote
of 7 to 4.71
Professor Claude describes the n'sult
of this ease as follows: "Far more
genuinely than the Dominican case, the
Cuban case in its l\larch 1962 phase
constituted a substantial victory for the
United States demand that the Security
Council II(' debarred from exercising
control ov('r tl\(' I'nforccnumt aetivitiC's
of the OAS. ,,72 f t is true that these two
cases, taken together, constitute a rather

t:ollll'l'IIing interpn'lati(lll of L1w It'rm
""nforcenu:nt m:lioll ,. as lIot including
those mensurt!s seL fm·th in article ·1.\ of
the chartl·r. It would seem, however,
that Professor Claude's insistence that
this interpretation was taken because of
the U.S. "demand" is unfair. It may just
he, contrary to the critical thesis
adopted hy Professor Claude, that this
interpretation was adopted by large
majorities of the SC'curity Council because it was the correct one. Certainly,
it was forcefully argued by many states
other than the United States, and essentially hy those states which were interested in preserving what they considered
to be the reasonable authorities of a
regional organization to handle local
disputes in a pacific manner, free from a
possiblt~ big power veto. Universalists
may dislike what they see emerging
from the Dominican Republic and
Cuban cases, but, once again, it reflects
nothing more than the desire of states
to seck some workable collective system
for resolving disputes. If the veto-bound
Security Council cannot provide this
system, states must he expected to look
elsewhere.
The dangers inherent in this departure from universalism, however,
wcrl' dramaticlIlly outlined hy the reprel'enlative of tIll' SoviC't lInion in the
discussions of the Cuhan queslion. In
clearly prophetic terms, he stated:
If todOlY the Set:urity Couneil fllils
to nullify the unlawful decisions
thus taken against Cuba, then
tomorrow similar action may he
taken against any other cou"ntry
of Latin America, Africa, Asia or
any other continent whose neighhors, upon some pretext or another, having assembled at a regional meeting, arbitrarily decide
to apply it to the machinery of
eocrcion in th,· form of ('nforccment action, thus usurping the
prerogatives of the Security Council. 73
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The Cuban Quarantine (October 1962). On 22 October 1962, President John F. Kennedy announced to
the worId 74 that the United States had
imposed a "strict quarantine" on all
offensive weapons to Cuba, including
nuclear missiles which were being installed in that country by the Soviet
Union. Almost immediately thereafter
the Council of the Organization of
American States met in its capacity as
the Provisional Consultative Organ
under the Rio Treaty, at the request of
the United States, and unanimously
recommended to all members of the
OAS that they take "all measures •.. including the use of armed force ... " to
prevent Cuba from continuing to receive
military supplies from the Sino·Soviet
powers which may threaten the peace
and security of the Americas and "to
prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an
active threat to the ~eace and security
of the Continent."7 The quarantine
became effective at 1000, Wednesday,
24 October, and was enforced by hundreds of U.S. planes and ships and
several from other members of the
OAS. 76 For the first time since the
1947 Palestine case, a regional organization had resorted to the use of force.
It is not the intention of this paper
to debate the legality of the a!'liong
taken by the United States and hy the
O/\S. This has he en argued at length hy
many.77 It is important to not(', however, that the official U.S. and OAS
justifications for their actions were
hased, not on the self-defensive provisions of article 51 which most puhlicists
seem to prefer, but rather on the authority of a regional organization to
deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security under articles 52 and 53.
·\t tIlt> urgent requests of the llnited
States, the Soviet lInion, and Cuha. th('
~t'eurit v Council C(lllvt'll<'d Oil :2:~ (letoht'r i I)h2 to con::idt'r tilt' ::ituation.
The gravity and urgency of the situation

prevented any genuine dehate over the
legalities involved. I t was contended, of
course, that the actions of the United
States in effecting a "blockade" of Cuba
were flagrant violations of international
law and should he condemned as
sueh. 78 Ambassador Stevenson of the
United States, although terming the
OAS actions as "defensive measures
taken by the American Republics to
'protect the Western Hemisphere against
long-range Soviet nuclear missiles," did
not find it necessary to debate the
legality of this issue in view of the
initiatives of the U.N. Secretary General
to mediate the dispute. 79 Neither the
United States nor other OAS members
had any difficulty, however, in finding
ample authority in hoth the Charter of
the United Nations and in the Charter
of the Organization of American States
for their actions. 8o Only one memher
of the Security Council contended that
the OAS actions were "enforcement
actions" which were improper without
Security Council authorization. In
arguing on this point, the representative
of Ghana stated:
... if it is recalled that the United
States delegation, in previous dehat('s, had exprt'ssed the view that
enforcement adion con::ists of
co('reive mea::un's involvinl! lhn
use of air, sea or land forces, of
the type falling within the scope
of Artidn 42, tillm it is "'('ar lhat
the action cOlltemplated by the
United States must be regarded as
enforcement aetion, which is inadmissihle in terms of Article 53,
without the authorization of the
Security CounciL 81
As noted above, however, the machinery of the Security Council proved
inarlt'quate to a solution of this conflict
IlI'tw('t'lI the two ::upt~rpowt'r". Con::e·
I1tH'lIlly. no at'lion was lakt'n whit,h
t'ould Ill' inll'rpn'lt'd as lIlakilll! a rl'solution of Ihis Ghanaian argument. Instt'ad,
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the Secretary General undertook mediation of the dispute directly between the
powers involved, and, as history re.counts, the dispute was resolved by
removal of the Soviet missiles from
Cuba and by the Soviet agreement to
discontinue any further shipments. The
naval quarantine was lifted on 20 November 1962.82
In an address made on 3 November
1962, Mr. Abram Chayes, the Legal
Advisor to the Department of State,
outlined the official U.S. legal rationale
for the Cuhan quarantine. 83 Mr.
Chayes' essential position was that the
fundamental authority for the OAS
action was contained in articles 6 and 8
of the Rio Treaty, which provide for
collective action, including the usc of
armed force, in the case of an armed
attack and in the situation where any
An1l'rican state is threatencd hy an
"aggression which is not an armed attack ... or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of
America." Regarding the use of force in
implementation of the quarantine, Mr.
Chayes likened the collective procedures
of the OAS to those of the United
Nations and argued that the "assent" of
the parties, including Cuba, to the provisions of the OAS Charter and the Rio
Pact, to~ether with the established collective proccdurcs, legitimizcs "thc usc
of forcc in accordancc with the OAS
resolution dealing with a threat to thc
peace in the hemisphere."84 Although
this argument may appear questionable,
the political rationale which underlies it
does not. Mr. Chayes said:
... the drafters of the Charter
demonstrated their wisdom by
making Security Council responsibility for dealing with threats to
the peacc "primary" and not
"exclusive." For events since
1945 have demonstrated that the
Security Council, like our own
electoral college, was not a viable
institution. The veto has made it

substantially useless in keeping
the peace.
The withering away of the
Security Council has led· to a
search for alternative peacekeeping institutions. In the United
Nations itself the General Assembly and the Secretary-General
have filled the void. Regional
organizations are another obvious
candidate. 85
Not until April 1963 did Mr. Chayes
undertake to provide an answer to the
Ghanaian argument that the OAS actions were "enforcement actions" impermissible under article 53 of the
charter. 86 In so doing, \1r. Chayes
commented on the gradual narrowing
by the Security Council of thosc provisions of article 5:3( L), dealing with
enforcement action. He interpreted the
actions of the Security Council in the
1960 Dominican Republic case and in
the January-February 1962 Cuban case
as indicating a retroactive approval by
the Security Council of "enforcement
actions" taken by the OAS against those
statcs. This, he explained, resulted from
the refusal of the Security Council to
condemn those actions. Thus, he ·asscrted, it is not necessary to obtain prior
approval of tl\(~ Sceurity Council to
Icgitimize an enforcement action. It is
enough that the Security Council fails
to disapprove them.
This is an unfortunate argument,
indeed, since it plainly overlooks the
position advocated by the United States
throughout both of these prior cases
that the OAS actions were not enforcement actions. 87
There is no question that the OAS
implementation of the Cuban quarantine involved action by sea and air
forces so as to hring it within the
meaning of the term "action" as used in
the "enforcement action" of article 5:3,
and there is no question but that the
argument advanced by Mr. Chayes that
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prior approval for a regional enforcement action need not be obtained must
be rejected. This does not mean, however, that the charter prohibits the
action taken. Reference to the two
documents establishing the quarantine
will show clearly that it was taken not
as an "enforcement action" as that term
is used in article 53(2), but rather as a
"preventive" action coming within the
com~etence of a regional organization. 8 In the Presidential proclamation
announcing the quarantine, President
Kennedy stated that the Congress of the
United States had declared that the
United States "is determined to prevent . .. Cuba from extending by force
or the threat of force, its aggressive or
subversive activities to any part of this
hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the
creation or use of an externally supported m~litary capabili.ty endange~~n?
the security of the Umted States.. 8
Similarly, the OAS resolution calling for
the quarantine sought to ensure that
Cuba "cannot continue to receive ... [military materiel] ... which
may threaten the peace and security of
the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability
from ever becoming an active threat to
the peace and security of the conti,,90
nen.
t
It seems obviom: that both tlw PreRident and the Council of the OAS were
saying that the actions to be taken were
"preventive" acti~ns spoken of in article
1(1), of the charter-actions which are
not prohibited to a regional organization by the provisions of article 53(2).
The Dominican Republic Case
(1965). The next, and the last, in this
series of OAS actions was the crisis in
the Dominican Republic which commenced in April 1965.
I t will be remembered that during
tlw course of a relwllion in the Dominican Republic in late April, the A lIleriCiln
Amhassador in the Dominican Republic
reported that the Dominican authorities

had stated that they "could no longer
control the situation, that American and
foreign lives were in desperate danger
and that outside forces were required.,,91 On the evening of 28 April
1965, in response to an urgent appeal
from the U.S. Ambassador, President
Johnson announced the landing of 400
U.S. Marines in these words:
I have ordered the Secretary of
Defense to put the necessary
American troops ashore in order
to give protection to hundreds of
Americans who are still in the
Dominican Republic and to escort
them safely back to this country.
The same assistance will be available to the nationals of other
countries, some of whom have
already asked for our help.92
In a television address to the nation
on 2 May 1965, President Johnson
reiterated the necessity for the landing
of American troops for the protection
of American nationals. He went further,
however, and explained that the resources of the Organization of American
States were now active in seeking a
solution to the Dominican problem. lie
explained that the "revolutionary movement had taken a tragic turn" and thnt
CornmuniHt leadc~rs had tak('11 inCf(~aHc~cJ
control. He thereafter effectively modified the U.S. purpose in retaining its
forces in the Dominican Republic in the
following words: "The American nations cannot, must not, and will not
permit the estahlishment of another
communist government in the Western
Hemisphere. ,,93
The Dominican situation first came
to the official attention of the OAS on
27 April 1965, when the United States
requested a meeting of the InterAmerican Peace Committee to consider
the prohlem. 94 On 28 April the OAS
waR informed of the Amcrican dcdsion
to land troops, and a special meeting of
the OAS Council was conv('ncd on the
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afternoon of that same day. On 30 April
the first significant OAS action was
taken-a resolution calling for a ceasefire and for a neutral zone of refuge in
Santo Domingo. 95 On I May the OAS
established a special five-member committee to go to the Dominican Republic
and to offer its good offices in mediation of the dispute and to assist in the
reestablishment of peace and order. On
() May the OAS acted to create an
Inter-American Peace Force, composed
of contingents from those OAS member
states capable of providing them and to
operate in the Dominican Republic,
under the following guidance.
This Force will have as its sole
purpose, in a spirit of democratic
impartiality, that of cooperating
in thc restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican RcpuhIic, in maintaining the security of
its inhabitants and the inviolahility of human rights, ancl in the
estahlishment of an atmosphere of
peace and conciliation that will
permit the functioning of democratic institutions. 96
This force, consisting ultimately of
approximately 20,000 troops, came into
being on 2:J !\Iay 19()!i. It was comprised of forces from five OAS member
states97 and was commanded by a
Brazilian glmeraI. 98
During the course of these events,
the Security Council held lengthy and
acrimonious debates over what was
termed the "armed intervention by the
United States in the internal affairs of
the Dominican Repuhlic 99 ... in violation of the fundamental principles of
the United Nations Charter and the
universally recognized rules of international law.,,1 00 Amhassador Stevenson,
on 3 \lay I 96!i, stressed that the Organization of American States "lllIs for
!'everal days heen dealing with the situation and has made substantial progress.,,1 0 1 Although he pointedly

argued, as had President Johnson in his
2 i\lay aqdress, that the A merican states
wert! unwilling to "permit thl' estahlishment of another Communist Government in the western hemisphere,,,1 02
he stressed that the initial U.S. motivation was to provide needed protection
to its nationals. He then outlined the
ultimate U.S. purpose as the: "reestablishment of constitutional government and, to that end, to assist in
maintaining the stability essential to the
expression of the free ehoice of the
Dominican people.,,1 03 The argument
was stridently advanced that the actions
of the United States could receive no
color of legality hy clothing them with
the authority of the OAS. 1t was argued
again, as it had been during the 19()2
Cuhan crisis, that the OAS had no
authority to resort to the use of foree in
tlH' seLLlelllent of a regional dispute
without first obtaining the approval of
the Security Council, and condemnation
of the action of hoth the United States
and the OAS was soughl. 104 Notwithstanding these arguments, the Security
Council ultimately took no aelion to
condemn the activities of either the
United States or the OAS. It did,
however, enact two resolutions calling
for cl'ase-fires l 05 and inviting the Seerl'tary C; 1'11t'rlll to 51'1111 a rl'prl'Hlmtllt iVt' to
the Dominican Republic to n'port to
tlH' SI~curity Council on the situation.
l\lr. JO!'I' A. I\lavohl"l' llimost inllnediately was dispat~hed by the Secretary
General, and through the medium of his
periodic reports the Security Council
was kept advised of the Dominican
developments. 106 Both the United Nations and the OAS thereafter maintained a presence in the Dominican
Repuhlic, although not without some
conflict; 07 until the crisis was ultimatl'ly brought under control.
Tht' Dominican Hepuhlie case must
hI' hrokt'n down into its two sl~parate
aspects-first, the initial, unilateral landing of troops hy the Unitt'd States for
the protection of its nationals; and
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secondly, the retention of those troops
in the country, augmented by troops
from other OAS member states, under
OAS auspices.
The first of these, although condemned b~ many, 1 08 has been justified
by others 09 as a legitimate exercise of
unilateral self-defense or unilateral forcible self-help for humanitarian purposes. Whatever may be one's position
in this controversy, it must be conceded
that it is much less difficult to find a
legal rationale for what was certainly a
necessary but limited action to save
human lives than it is to justify the
subsequent substantial and prolonged
presence of American and OAS
troOps.ll0
There is little doubt that this latter
action stemmed primarily, if not totally,
from the fear of the United States,
conveyed with conviction to at least
two-thirds of the states in the OAS, that
Communist forces had taken over
leadership of the Dominican rebellion
and that there was a definite danger that
they would succeed in capitalizing on
the turmoil and in establishing a Communist government in that country.
This fear, voiced by both Ambassador
Stevenson and President Johnson, 111
has led some prominent Americans to
conclude that it was the motivatinf
force behind thc initial U.S. actions. 1 I
Whether or not this criticism is justified
is difficult to say, but it is perfectly
clear that only a few short days after
the crisis erupted this did become the
principal, if not the sole, U.S. and OAS
motivation. The purpose for which the
OAS Inter-American Peace Force was
created-" cooperating in the restoration
of normal conditions in the Dominican
Republic ... and in the establishment
of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that wiII permit the functioning of
democratic inslitutions"-makcs this
conl'iusion in('scapahl,'.
The \)ominil'lI11 l'risis TI'pn's"lItc'li thl'
epitome of what has hl'en called thc
('ffort of the United States to seck

"from the Inter-Amcrican system 'the
legitimacy of multilateralism,' or to put
it more simply, an OAS label for her
hemispheric policies. »113 This process
was well on its way when, in 1954, the
OAS adopted the Caracas Resolution
condemning the intervention of international communism in inter-American
affairs and declaring that:
... the domination of control of
the political institutions of any
American State by the international communist movement,
extending to this Hemisphere the
political system of an extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty
and political independence of the
American States, endangering the
peace of America, and would call
for a Meeting of Consultation to
'consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with ex. .
Istmg
trea t'1es. 114
This resolution, adopted at the insistence of the United States, was widely
regarded as a "revivification of the
Monroe Doctrine, shifted from a unilateral to Ta multilateral axis, and directed agamst Communism rather than
Colonialism. »115 It is a fair comment
that thc provisions of this resolution
have I)(~en the principal ha!lill for U.s.
hemispheric policy since 1954. Indeed,
it has been said that the switch of the
United States to a policy of regionalism
was designed to ensure its ability to
fight communism in the Western Hemisphere unimpaired by the Soviet
veto. 116 This was certainly borne out in
the Cuban cases discussed above and in
the Dominican crisis of 1965. Whether
or not, howevcr, the Caracas Resolution
provides any legal basis for this lattcr
action, and specifically for thc military
intervention by the OAS, is quite anoth('r mall('r. I t could III~ IIr~lI('d. of
c'oursc" liS iii)!,!! I'rofl'lIsor It'ulk. t hut:
The appropriate institution for
partisan supranational action is Lo
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be found in the regional level.
Here the stabilizing value of political homogeneity for a group of
closely related states favors a
political use of regional organization even though this may involve
on occasions a betrayal of the
ideals of national self-determination .•.. It is unfortunate in many
respects to compel dissenting
national communities to conform
to regional political preferences,
but it may be indispensable for
the maintenance of minimum conditions of international stabiIity.117
This argument, however, does not provide any legal basis, under current international law, for the actions taken by
the OAS in the Dominican case. At
most, it provides a tenuous political
rationale.
Professor Fenwick offers what is
perhaps the best legal rationale, as follows:
In the past riot and disorder have
as a rule not been considered
sufficiently important to constitute a threat justifying intervention. But I would ~ay today that if
a revolution should hrcak out in
one country or another, the Organization of American States
would he justified in doing what it
could to prevent a civil war. The
days of civil war are over. You
cannot have a civil war today
without disturbing the peace, certainly not in America. Consequently, I interpret the Rio
Treaty, Article 6, where it speaks
of a threat to the peace, in a
broader sense than it would have
been
interpreted
50 years
ago .•.. J 18

It is trut' that "You cannot have a civil
war today without disturbing the peace,
certainly not in America," and, cer-

tainly not if thai civil war appears to be
Communist inspired. If such a situation
creates a breach of international peace
and security or threatens to create such
a breach, it would be appropriate for
the cognizant regional organization to
seek its settlement. But it would seem,
if the purposes of the charter are not to
be tortured to undue lengths, that the
modes of regional settlement should be
short of the use of armed force. Nevertheless, the OAS did resort to the use of
armed force, and there was a steadfast
refusal of the Security Council to take
any action other than to itself seek
resolution of the dispute. One can only
conclude that this refusal of the Security Council to condemn the action of
the OAS must be considered to have at
least added the color of legality to it. In
terms of actions lawful for a regional
organization to take, in accordance with
the discussion set forth previously,
therefore, it can only be described as a
"preventive action" involving the use of
armed force.
The
Czechoslovakia
Case
(August 1968). This chronicle of events
could not be concluded without at least
a brief discussion of the Soviet and
Warsaw Pact military intervention in
\.zeehoslovakia in late A IIgUAt 19()B. It
was precisely this event which has
driven home, with startling drama, the
dangers inherent in the positions taken
by the United Stales and most other
OAS member states in the series of
inter-American actions diseussed above.
During the late evening of 20 August
1968, massive movements of Warsaw
Pact troops into Czechoslovakia commenced. Participating were units from
the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. 119 Before
these movements were concluded, over
'100,000 Warsaw Pact troops were tlcploYl'd in Czerho!'lovllkill, Ot'cul'yill~
strategic positions and maintaining effective foreign military contr01 throughout the country.
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On 21 August, six memiwrs of tl\(~
Security Council-Canada, FnlJl('e, Paraguay, the United Kingdom, and tlw
United States-requested an urgent
meeting of the Council to consider this
situation, which was described as an
armed intervention contrary to the provisions of the charter. 12 0 The debates
on this issue in the Security Council
compare favorably with any ever hcld in
invective and acrimony, accusation and
counteraccusation, and in political,
rather than legal, overtones. Nevertheless, there were claims of illegality by
almost all members of the Security
Council, claims which branded the
Soviet and Warsaw Pact action as an
unlawful intervention in the internal
affairs of a sovereign state12 1 av.d as a
plain violation of the basic tenets of the
charter, particularly article 2(1).122
The delegate .from the Soviet Union
answered these allegations with what
must be considered his legal rationale
for his country's actions, and as any
astute student of international law
could have predicted, his arguments did
not appear too different from those
advanced by the United States in the
series of OAS actions discussed above.
His first position was based on the
jurisdictional issue. He asserted that no
state affected by the Warsaw Paet action
had requested the Security Council to
discuss this maller and that, in any case,
the "events in Czechoslovakia were a
matter for the Czechoslovak people and
the States of the Socialist community,
linked together as they were hy common responsibilities, and for them
alone. ,,1 2 ~
When this position was overruled and
the Council proceeded to a debate of
the substance of the matter, the Soviet
representative then argued that "the
decision of the Socialist countries to
help the Czel'hoslovak IH'ople was fully
l-()n~IlIHlllt with the riv:ht of p('upll-s to
individual nnd l'olh-l'Iiw :;df·dl'f(-n~e as
provided for in till' Charter and ... in
the Warsaw Pact."1 24 He initially con-

tended that the inl!-rv('ntion was lIt tlw
of the Cz(-(-hoslovak (;ov(-rnmcnt, 125 hut wlwn this WlIS "ratll"~d as
untrue by the Czechoslovak Government itself,126 the argument was
changed to state, in essence, that members of the Warsaw Pact " •.. bore full
responsibility" for the ~mity of the
Socialist States and that the " .•• fraternal countries firmly and resolutely
opposed their unbreakable solidarity to
any outside threat; nobody would ever
be allowed to wrest a single link from
the community of socialist states.,,1 2 7
He thus contended that the "socialist
community" had a right to prevent, by
force, any infringement on that "(~om
munity" and to prevent, hy force, any
defection from that "community" by
any member state.
rl'l}llI~st

These arguments were strikingly unconvincing. An eight-power draft resolution condemning the intervention and
calling for the withdrawal of all intervening forces was brought to a vote on
23 August. It received a favorable vote
of 10 members for to 2 against but was
not adopted because of the negative
vote of the Soviet Union which cast its
105th veto to defeat the resolution.
Although further debate was held, the
Security Council took no action in the
case and diseontill\\('d its consid('rlltion
of the matter at the request of the
Government of Czechoslovakia on 27
August, when it appeared that bilateral
negotiations between the Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia were progressing
toward a solution of the crisis. 12'1!
The Soviet legal rationale, which was
really only hinted at in the Security
Council debates, was expanded upon
and further delineated in a Pravda article which appeared on 25 September
1968. 129 Later, in an address to the
G(-11I'rnl t\~~I-lIIbly of tl1l' {Inill'd Nations
on :~ Oe[olu-r, tl1l' Sovi(,t I"on'i~n 1\ Iinistl-r, AIlIln-i A. (;rolllyko, (l"fille(1 thi!!
rationale in UllIuistakably c1ellr terms.
He said:
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The Soviet Union deems it lI('cesBUry to proclaim from this rostrum, too, that the socialist states
cannot and will not allow a situation where the vital interests of
socialism are infringed upon and
encroachments are made on the
inviolability of the boundaries of
the socialist commonwealth and,
therefore, on the foundations of
international peace. 13 0
The Soviet Union thus announced its
own Monroe Doctrine and the Warsa-iv
Pact its own Caracas Resolution. The
Brezhnev Doctrine, which this has come
to be called, 13 1 reasserts the familiar
concept of a "socialist Commonwealth
of Nations" but firmly rejects the traditional thesis that the "socialist Commonwealth" is constructed "on the
basis of complete equality, respect for
territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty and noninterference in each other's affairs.,,1 32 The
Brezhnev Doctrine clearly envisions not
only the right, but the responsibility, of
the Warsaw Pact nations to intervene in
the affairs of any member state when
the "integrity" of the socialist community as a whole is fdt to he threatened.
As starkly unlawful liB this lIlay St!em,
it does not differ in principle from
President Johnson's statement made
during the Dominican Republic crisis of
1965, that "the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the
establishment of another communist
government in the Western Hemisphere.,,1 3 3 This position, taken at the
highest level in the U.S. Government in
both the Dominican Republic and in
other eases, deliberately rejected the
Soviet warning given during the 1960-61
Cuban crisis, which for sake of emphasis
will be quoted here again:
If tot/ay till' ~I'l'urity Council fails
to nullify tIl!' unlawful decisions
thus taken :Igainst Cuha, then

tomorrow similar udioll muy he
tuken ugainst ully otll!'r country
of Latin America, Africa, Asia or
any other continent whose neighbors, upon some pretext or another, huving assemhled at a regional meeting, arbitrarily decide
to apply it to the machinery of
coercion in the form of enforcement action, thus usurping the
prerogatives of the Security Council. 13 '4
With this background, it must be said
that the United S'tates, for essentially its
own political purposes, has been principally responsible for creating a series
of precedents which lend some color of
reason to the Soviet efforts to legitimatize its Czechoslovakia intervention.
At the very least, it must be said that
the precedents set by prior OAS actions
make it difficult to deny the efficacy of
admonitions such as that of Harlan
Cleveland, when he said in 1963:
"Watch carefully the precedents you
set. You will have to live with the
institutions you create. The law you
make may be your own.,,1 3 5
IV -CONCLUSIONS

At the out!'ct of this paper, lilt! lhcsiH
was proposed that intervention as a
sanction for an international delict was
legitimatized hy contemporary inlcrnntional law, provided such intervention
was taken by a collectivity of states
acting either through or under the
auspices of the United Nations. It has
also been noted throughout this paper
that if the "effective collective" procedures promised by the charter do not'
materialize, that states must be expected to look elsewhere for the previously h~ld right of unilat('ral s('lf-help
whi('h has he(,ll d('nil,d to thl'm. That
Ihi!' lalll'r l'Our~t' of Ilt'tioll hllB htWII
fully suhsl'rillt'd to by the world's major
powers should be obvious from the case
histories digested above, as should IH~,
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also, the basic thesis that collective
intervention hy regional groupings, at
least where a major power is a partner in
the intervening collectivity, has heen
sanctioned consistently by the inaction
of the Security Council. Thus, where
the direct interests of the major powers
are involved, the regional collectivity
has become the principal and preferred
instrument for the settlement of disputes within those areas of Great Power
political dominance. The long and tortuous path which has led to this triumph
of regionalism over the universalism of
the charter is cluttered with the debris
of article ~(4) and article 5:3( I), hoth of
which have been emasculated by politically motivated reinterpretations of the
charter, reinterpretations which have
been necessary so that regional groupings could take action, with some semblance of legitimacy, which was considered politically essential. Although
the arguments accompanying each of
the incidents involved were cast frequently in legal terms, their real import
was not legal, but political, in nature.
This has brought about a situation
where, not without difficulty, but with
precedent, one can interpret the charter
so as to give some color of legitimacy to
the flagrant violation of Czechoslovakian sovereignty by the Soviet lInion,
a situation which it can be said with
complete fairness was never intended by
the writers of the charter.
Regional organizations, it is true,
offer a practical and useful mechanism
for the resolution of intraregional disputes and for the imposition of sanctions for a verified international delict.
And it is true, also, that this sort of
collective sanction is far preferable to
the unilateral sanctions which characterized the traditional law. But it becomes less true, indeed not true, when
these organizations arc converted into
"~roups of states called to ratify tl1l'
decisions of a Great Power, "lor where
they become merely the " ... chosen
instruments of the great antagonists

locked in political (·onnict. ,,2 It is this
taLLer point which has b('en the ~('at
source of difficulty. The Brezhnev Doctrine, the Caracas Resolution, and the
statement by President Johnson during
the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis
have operated to transmute what were
essentially political matters-i.e., the
operation of an antagonistic political
doctrine-into an international legal
wrong. With this transmutation, and
with the claim that such a delict has
been committed, the regional grouping
is provided with the legal basis for
regional preventive or cnforcement
m{'asures or for regional preventive
action. Thus sanctions are imposed with
some color of legality, and the international community is powerless to object. Regional groupings, therefore, have
become instruments of a universal order
in which law is subordinated to politics
and instruments of power politics3
through which the United States and
the Soviet Union justify their actions as
consistent with the charter.
This resurgent emphasis on politics
rather than law-albeit clothed at times
in legal terminology-is not condemned.
It is simply noted as a fact of international life. The legitimacy of collective
intervention as a sanction for an international delict has been confirmed, as has
been its perversion into "an instrument
for political action. This demands the
observation that the effectiveness of a
system of international law does not
depend upon the design or clarity of its
charter, which clever minds can always
interpret to their favor, but rather on
the willingness of its subjects, particularly its powerful ones, to be judged by
it. There can be no effective international
system for the resolution of conflict, for
the identification and sanctioning of
wrongs, until the parties to that system
are prepared to have it operate sometimes
against what they consider to be their
national advantage.4
It has been rightly observed that
" ... what counts most in resolving dis-
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putes is not so much the choice of a
forum as a genuine desire to settle,
which always carries with it a willingness to lose.,,5 There is no evidence, as
yet, that the Great Powers are in any

sense developing this "willingness to
lose." Politics, not law, will determine
the legitimacy .of collective interventions in the future as it undoubtedly has
in the past.
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